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Effects of centralized and local PV plant control for voltage
regulation in LV feeder based on cyber-physical simulations
Theis Bo RASMUSSEN1 , Guangya YANG1, Arne Hejde NIELSEN1,
Zhaoyang DONG2
Abstract In the modern power system, both local and
centralized reactive power control strategies for photo-
voltaic (PV) plants, are proposed and compared. While
local control improves the network security, it lacks the
optimization benefits from centralized control strategies.
Therefore, this paper considers the coordination of the two
control strategies, depending on external impact from the
weather system and consumer behavior, in a low voltage
(LV) distribution feeder. Through modeling and simulation
in an established real-time cyber-physical simulation plat-
form, the LV network is evaluated with both local and
centralized control. A set of boundaries for coordinating
between the two strategies are identified, which can help
network operators in deciding suitable control in different
operating situations. Furthermore, the cyber-physical sim-
ulation platform, is used to study the impact of physical
perturbations, i.e. changes in irradiance and consumption,
and cyber disturbances, in form of communication channel
noise, is evaluated for the control strategies. Results show
how small and large disturbances in the cyber system
affects the centralized control strategy optimizer
performance.
Keywords Distribution Network, Voltage regulation,
Photovoltaics, Cyber-physical system
1 Introduction
Through governmental subsidies and a general interest
in converting to renewable sources of energy, both wind
and solar based generation have experienced an increased
level of penetration in the power system. From a low
voltage (LV) distribution network perspective, countries
like Denmark have seen a rise in the integration of roof-top
photovoltaic (PV) plants at residential consumers. While
the climate benefits from integrating renewables are obvi-
ous, the integration challenges the security of the power
system [1].
The integrated generating units place additional stress
on the network infrastructure, especially as voltage rise
problems at nodes far away from the feeder root node.
These problems occur due to the unidirectional power flow
design of the radial feeders. This place a necessity for PV
plant control methods, that can alleviate voltage rise
problems [1, 2].
From an economic perspective, curtailment of PV gen-
eration is considered a last resort, which focus research on
voltage regulation using reactive power control. Local
control strategies utilize local measurements to decide on
an appropriate power factor or reactive power set-point,
and typically follow a droop-based control scheme with a
defined droop ratio [1]. The definition of the droop ratio
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can be done through grid code specification [3, 4] or more
advanced coordination-based approaches [5, 6]. Similar for
all local control strategies is their ability to alleviate volt-
age rise issues, but also their limited capability to adjust to
overall optimization since they follow a certain profile
[7].
To achieve optimal utilization of power system infras-
tructure, minimizing the network losses or limiting the
voltage variations, centralized methods based on opti-
mization are proposed [7, 8]. The integration of such
methods requires communication of network measure-
ments, processing of the data, and ultimately communica-
tion of the controls. Therefore, the utilization of centralized
control depends on the information and communications
technology (ICT) infrastructure [9, 10].
When evaluating the performance of the centralized
control strategies, it is important to consider the effects of
disturbances in the acquisition, communication and com-
mand process, especially as centralized control tend to push
the operation of the network towards vulnerable regions
[7–9]. The investigation of cyber disturbances on central-
ized control strategies can be done using a cyber-physical
simulation platform [10, 11]. Such a platform can model
and simulate the cyber and physical systems to show the
relations between the two domains at different levels of
complexity. For the evaluation of centralized control of PV
plants in LV networks, the simulation platform must sup-
port optimization and real-time control, which emulates the
processes in a control center. With a simulation platform
capable of emulating a distribution network control center,
both local and centralized control strategies can be simu-
lated with the aim of coordinating their use during different
operational situations.
In current literature, local and centralized reactive power
control strategies, for residential PV plants, have been
proposed and compared, but there is no literature sup-
porting the decision-making process between the two
strategies according to different operational scenarios
[1, 5, 7]. Coordinating between the two control strategies
enables the exploitation of the voltage rise alleviation
capabilities from local control, and the overall optimality
benefits from centralized control. Therefore, this paper
proposes an identification of boundaries in the irradiance-
consumption plane of a LV radial feeder, which serve as a
base for coordination of centralized and local reactive
power control of residential PV plants.
The intention with this coordination is to assist the
network operator in the decision-making, and thereby
ensure secure operation of LV networks in the cyber-
physical system, without the shortcomings of each indi-
vidual control strategy. The proposed coordination, there-
fore considers the risk of perturbations and disturbances in
the cyber-physical system. It is based on extensive testing
through cyber-physical modeling and real-time simulation
of residential PV plants, using the Cigre´ European LV
residential feeder as an example [12].
Results from the cyber-physical simulator show two
zones for coordinating reactive power control, one area
where the centralized control improves the operation of the
network without jeopardizing the security of supply, and
one region where local control is suggested. Furthermore,
the simulations with cyber disturbances during centralized
control show how artifacts in the communication channels
can have a considerable impact of the performance of the
control strategy.
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2
presents the reactive power control strategies considered
for coordination in this work. Section 3 discusses the
simulation requirements for evaluating the control strate-
gies, and describes the establishment of the real-time
cyber-physical simulation platform. Section 4 presents the
evaluation method for coordinating the control strategies
from a cyber-physical perspective. Section 5 describes the
considered case study LV feeder and test scenarios, Sect. 6
presents the simulation results and their analysis, and
Sect. 7 concludes.
2 Reactive power control strategies
For local control of reactive power from PV plants, there
exist different open loop approaches, e.g. constant power
factor, constant reactive power, inverter power factor as a
function of the active power injection, cos u(P), and
inverter reactive power transfer as a function of the ter-
minal node voltage magnitude, Q(V) [3].
Besides the proposal of different strategies, current lit-
erature focus on finding appropriate droop ratios for dif-
ferent methods [6, 13–15], and on coordinating these
parameters in a specific feeder [5]. Since the focus of the
current study is to identify boundaries for the purpose of
coordinating between local and centralized control, a grid
code specified implementation of cos u(P) control is
considered.
The chosen droop rate considered for all the PV plants in
this work, is based on the grid codes from the Danish
transmission system operator [4]. This strategy is shown
graphically in Fig. 1.
Local reactive power control has static characteristics
and open loop, as it strictly follows the reactive power
control plan. Oppositely, centralized control comes with
added capabilities of optimizing the operation of the dis-
tribution network towards a desired objective, i.e. mini-
mizing voltage deviation, reactive power flows, active
power losses, etc. [2, 7, 8].
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Since the focus of this work is to investigate the local
and centralized control coordination, the optimization
problem of the centralized controller is formulated with the
objective to minimize the active power losses through
identification of optimal inverter reactive power set points.
By minimizing the active power losses in the distribution
network, the total amount of active power being distributed
is minimized, which allows better utilization of the power
system infrastructure. The mathematical model of the
optimization problem is described by the objective function
in (1) and the constraints in (2)-(7).
min z ¼
XNn
n¼1
ðPgenn  Ploadn Þ ð1Þ
s.t.
Pgenn  Ploadn ¼ jVnj
PNn
k¼1
jYnkjjVkj cosðhn  hk  dnkÞ 8n 2 Nn
ð2Þ
Qgenn  Qloadn ¼ jVnj
PNn
k¼1
jYnkjjVkj sinðhn  hk  dnkÞ 8n 2 Nn
ð3Þ
jSflowl j  Smaxl 8l 2 Nl ð4Þ
Pminn Pgenn Pmaxn 8n 2 Nn ð5Þ
Qminn Qgenn Qmaxn 8n 2 Nn ð6Þ
Vmin jVnj Vmax 8n 2 Nn ð7Þ
where z is the objective function; Nn is the total number of
nodes; Pgenn and Q
gen
n are the active and reactive power
output from the generating unit at node n; Ploadn and Q
load
n
are the active and reactive power consumption at node n;
jVnjis the voltage magnitude at node n; jYnkj is the mag-
nitude of admittance between nodes n and k; hn is the
voltage angle at node n; dnk is the angle of admittance
between nodes n and k; jSflowl j is the apparent power flow in
line l; Smaxl is the maximum apparent power flow in line l;
Pminn and P
max
n are the minimum and maximum active
power from generator at node n; Qminn and Q
max
n are the
minimum and maximum reactive power from generator at
node n; and Vmin and Vmax are the minimum and maximum
voltage magnitude at all nodes, assumed to be 0.9 p.u. and
1.1 p.u., respectively.
When solving the optimization problem in (1)-(7), the
active power generation of the PV plants is assumed
uncontrollable. The reactive power capabilities of the PV
plants are assumed limited in (6), by a power factor
between 0.9 lagging and 0.9 leading.
From a research perspective, local control strategies are
easier to investigate as the control can be modelled directly
in a power system simulator. For centralized control
strategies, the power system simulator must be connected
to computational software, capable of calculating the
optimal power flow (OPF) and finding the optimal solution
to the optimization problem in (1)-(7).
3 Real-time cyber-physical simulation platform
Numerous cyber-physical simulation platforms are pro-
posed in current literature, with different focus and levels
of complexity [11, 16]. The diversity of simulation plat-
forms is due to the specific focus of studies, which affect
the establishment of the platforms. Furthermore, while
real-time power system simulators can be purchased and
installed from manufacturers, current cyber-physical sim-
ulators are usually a combination of different software and
hardware components. These components are connected to
enable specific studies in different areas of power system
research, e.g. transmission, distribution, microgrids, etc.
To establish a cyber-physical simulation platform, it is
therefore important to define the study specific require-
ments and identify appropriate software and hardware
components. In this work, there are five main requirements.
The platform should,  be capable of solving the opti-
mization problem defined in (1)-(7), ` simulate a LV
distribution network with high penetration of PV, ´ allow
local control strategy implementation for the PV plants, ˆ
enable switching between different control strategies, and
˜ represent a completely controllable cyber network.
With the list of requirements, an appropriate power
system simulator would be the real time digital simulator
(RTDS), as it can simulate a LV distribution network and
allows implementation of local control strategies. The
RTDS is a combination of hardware and modeling soft-
ware, and has been extensively used in the formulation of
cyber-physical simulation platforms [11, 16–18]. The
RTDS allows real time external communication of simu-
lated values through GTNETx2 cards. These cards are
installed with firmware that correspond to different
Fig. 1 Reactive power control of PV plant using local control
according to Danish grid codes [4]
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protocols, such as PMU, DNP3 and IEC 61850 sampled
values.
The RTDS is not capable of performing the optimization
needed in the centralized PV control strategy, meaning it
must be connected to additional software components. The
MATLAB software can provide the needed optimization
capabilities, and allow customization of the mathematical
problem and the use of different solvers. Communication
of simulation results and control signals between RTDS
and MATLAB is possible by running the RTDS simulation
software, called Runtime, as a TCP server [19]. The Run-
time software is used to control and monitor the simula-
tions conducted by the RTDS and contains different meters
and actuators.
When running the Runtime software as a TCP server, its
meters and actuators are visible from MATLAB, which
enables direct control of the RTDS simulation through
MATLAB [19]. However, the acquisition of data is more
complicated as MATLAB must encode the Runtime meter
data to a specific syntax, and afterwards decode the value
to enable processing. Therefore, an alternative way of data
acquisition from RTDS to MATLAB is considered.
From current literature on cyber-physical simulation
platforms, the acquisition of data from RTDS can be done
through an open protocol communication (OPC) server
[17, 18]. These servers are commonly used in industrial
sites to manage the translation of data from different meters
to a common protocol [20]. An OPC server can therefore
directly communicate with the GTNETx2 card of the
RTDS. Furthermore, MATLAB provides an OPC toolbox,
making communication between the two components
simple to establish.
The main argument against using the OPC communi-
cation channel for control signals is due to the limited
computational resources of the RTDS, and the high relative
high requirements for enabling controls through the OPC
server.
The last requirement for the simulation platform
involves the representation of the cyber-system. In differ-
ent simulation platforms, communication system simula-
tors, e.g. OPNET and NS-3, or hardware is used
[11, 16–18]. While these give a realistic representation of
the cyber-system and the specific protocols, they have
limited controllability. For the current study focus, the
platform should allow full observability of the network,
and a representation of cyber disturbances, e.g. communi-
cation noise. Therefore, the cyber-system is emulated in the
MATLAB software through the control of noise added
after the acquisition of simulation results and before
sending control signals to RTDS.
Compared to current literature, the established platform
is similar to the platform proposed in [18], although with a
simplified cyber-system representation and the use of
MATLAB instead of a hardware implementation of the
control center. Likewise, the platform proposed in [17]
differs from the one used in this study by the cyber-system
representation and the use of Python to represent the con-
trol center.
When running, the cyber-physical simulation platform
executes as illustrated by the flowchart in Fig. 2. The
flowchart is split in a physical part, representing how
control actuation done in Runtime are continuously rec-
ognized by the representation of the physical system in the
RTDS and how the RTDS enables the external communi-
cation of measurements through the GTNETx2 card.
The cyber system is then executed according to the
DNP3 protocol and the user-defined execution. With the
DNP3 protocol, values are only updated when their change
is larger than a predefined threshold value [21]. Whenever
requested, MATLAB can read measurements from the
OPC server, update the parameter in the optimization
problem constraints in (5)-(6), find the optimal solution
through OPF, and send new control commands to the PV
plants in the test grid.
4 Evaluation of control strategies in cyber-
physical environment
To evaluate the cyber-physical nature of the power
system, and how it affects the usage of both local and
centralized reactive power control, different physical per-
turbations and cyber disturbances are considered.
In a LV feeder, considering faults on equipment most
likely interrupts services as controls are limited. Instead,
perturbations in the physical system considered in this
work are based on the impact from neighboring systems,
such as the weather system and the human interactions
The interdependency of the cyber-physical system
indicates the necessity for analyzing not only how pertur-
bations in the physical system affect the physical system,
but also how cyber disturbances affect the physical system.
Additionally, one could investigate how cyber disturbances
and physical perturbations affect the cyber system, how-
ever, this requires a more detailed and realistic
Fig. 2 Cyber-physical simulation platform execution flowchart
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representation of the ICT infrastructure, which is outside
the scope for the current study.
While perturbations in the physical system affect the
feeder when utilizing local and centralized control, cyber
disturbances will have a smaller impact on local control
since it is a continuous process. A single occurrence of
error will therefore quickly be erased compared to the
centralized control, where the control is only executed in a
discrete fashion.
Cyber disturbances that can affect the physical system
during centralized control, can be split into three areas.
Errors occurring  in the process of acquiring measure-
ments from the sensor and sending them to the centralized
controller, ` within the calculation of control commands,
and ´ in the process of communicating and performing the
commands send by the centralized controller.
In modern power systems, the use of state estimators for
reducing the inclusion of measurement error is a well-
known practice for improving the accuracy of the input to
further processing, such as the centralized controller
[22, 23]. The performance of the state estimator depends on
the algorithm and the degree of freedom, therefore, dif-
ferent situations of error in the data acquisition, will be
investigated in this study.
Since the occurrence of noise and error in the mea-
surement acquisition and communication channels are
possible due to the imperfections of the ICT infrastructure
[24–27], a situation where control signals from the central
controller are subject to error is also considered.
The analysis of the perturbations in the physical system
and cyber disturbances is done by running the cyber-
physical simulation platform while activating different
scenarios, one at a time. The impact of these scenarios is
evaluated through an analysis of the effects in voltage
magnitude and active power losses. The network losses are
used as a performance indicator as they are minimized in
the centralized control strategy
The scale of impact from the scenarios depends on the
power system feeder and the operational conditions con-
sidered. To scope the investigation, a Cigre´ European LV
feeder model is chosen and modified to represent a future
scenario, furthermore, a set of operational test scenarios
have been formulated in terms of environment operation
and component focus.
5 Case study LV feeder
The original Cigre´ LV feeder is presented in [12] and
illustrated in Fig. 3a. To identify the coordination between
local and centralized reactive power control of PV plants in
the LV feeder, through simulation in the established cyber-
physical simulation platform, the Cigre´ feeder has been
modified in four ways.
1) The load connected to node R1 in Fig. 3a is removed
and its demand is distributed among the rest of the
loads. This gives higher requirements of power
transfer and represents a feeder in an urban area of a
large city with large building blocks connected to each
load-point. The peak consumption of each load in the
modified grid is given in Table 1.
2) PV plants have been implemented at each of the load
points, as shown in Fig. 3b, representing a scenario
where each building block has invested in distributed
generation. The installed PV capacity at each building
block is given in Table 1.
Fig. 3 Original and modified single line diagrams of the Cigre´
European LV residential feeder [12]
Table 1 Modified Cigre´ LV feeder node peak consumption and
generation
Node Load (kVA) PV (kW)
R11 55 15
R15 92 42
R16 95 42
R17 75 21
R18 87 42
Total 404 162
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3) Due to the resource limitations of RTDS, the cables in
the original grid are aggregated to remove the nodes
with zero current injection as shown in Fig. 3b.
4) The cables connecting R1 to R3 and R4 to R6 have
been reinforced by implementing parallel lines to
allow the higher transport of power in the distribution
network.
All other grid details are as described for the original
Cigre´ European LV residential feeder described in [12].
To choose the operational conditions of the power sys-
tem environment, hourly data of irradiance for Copen-
hagen, Denmark (CPH) of the year 2005 [28], and hourly
consumption data from apartments in Denmark in 2012
[29] is found.
To give an indication of the occurrence of the combi-
nations of load and irradiance levels in CPH, the gathered
irradiance data have been rounded to nearest 10 W/m2, and
the gathered consumption data has been normalized to the
largest consumption in the year and rounded to nearest 1%
loading level. A heat map has been created as shown in
Fig. 4 by finding the corresponding point in the irradiance-
consumption plane for each hour in a year.
The current normal representation in Fig. 4 will change
in a future scenario as new and renovated buildings have
higher energy efficiency, which in general will lower the
consumption of electricity for heating and cooling, and
thereby shift the normal operating consumption towards
zero. Besides having higher energy efficiency, buildings in
the future will more likely be cost efficient as well. This
means that the penetration of household PV plants
increases. The irradiance scale in Fig. 4 can be considered
as the percentage from 0 to 100% of rated PV power, as PV
penetration increase in the future, the normal operating
irradiance is shifted towards the right.
5.1 Test scenarios
The first test scenario compares the two reactive power
control strategies while the system is not exposed to any
disturbances. The LV feeder is simulated in every possible
operating situation in the irradiance-consumption plane and
the results are evaluated from a voltage magnitude and
network loss perspective.
In the second test scenario, the system is exposed to
perturbations in the physical system, specifically as chan-
ges in consumption and irradiance level at node R15.
Again, the voltage magnitude and network loss results are
used to evaluate the effects of both reactive power control
strategies. Based on the first two test scenarios, a set of
guidelines for when to use local and centralized control, for
the specific feeder in question, is formulated as the iden-
tified boundaries in the irradiance-consumption plane.
The third, fourth and fifth test scenarios then investi-
gates the impact of cyber system disturbances on the cen-
tralized control strategy. The LV feeder is simulated in
three different operating situations and exposed to noise in
the data acquisition and command signal communication
channels. The results of the simulations are evaluated,
based on the effects on the optimizer performance, network
losses, and voltage magnitude of the most vulnerable node.
6 Results
Simulations of the modified feeder in all possible
combinations of the irradiance-consumption plane shown
in Fig. 4, are done using the cyber-physical simulation
platform. Specifically, the grid is simulated with a con-
sumption level of 5% to 100%, in steps of 5%, and irra-
diance of 50 W/m2 to 1000 W/m2 in steps of 50 W/m2. The
resulting loss comparison is shown in Fig. 5 where the
network losses as a function of irradiance level is plotted
for four different consumption levels for both central DC,
solid lines, and local DL, dashed lines, control.
Comparing the effect of the control strategies on the
network losses in the feeder, clearly show a large differ-
ence when the irradiance approaches 1000 W/m2, corre-
sponding to rated PV plant operation. This is due to the
inductive nature of the chosen reactive power control plan
used in the local control strategy and shown in Fig. 1. At
lower irradiance levels, the loss minimization from using
centralized control, reduces with the reduced reactive
power from the PV plants. In Fig. 5 the crosses represent
the smallest irradiance level at which centralized control
gives 1 kW less losses than local control.
An interesting observation in Fig. 5, is that there is an
optimal PV generation for each loading level where the
losses are minimal. This corresponds to the situation where
Fig. 4 Heatmap of irradiance and consumption data in Copenhagen
based on hourly data [18, 19]
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the consumption is mainly supplied by local PV, which
minimize the amount of power flows in the grid.
The results from the simulations are further used to
compare how the voltage magnitude is affected by local
and centralized reactive power control. Theoretically, the
highest voltage magnitude at any of the nodes in the
modified feeder would happen in the bottom right corner of
the irradiance-consumption plane, where consumption is
low, and irradiance is high. The node in the modified LV
feeder experiencing the highest voltage magnitude during
low consumption and high irradiance, is found to be
R15.
To investigate the voltage vulnerability of the system
during normal operational situations, the heatmap of irra-
diance and consumption in Fig. 4 is layered with contour
lines representing the node R15 voltage magnitude for each
operational scenario. Two sets of contour lines are included
in Fig. 6, the solid lines showing the results during cen-
tralized control, and dashed lines showing the results dur-
ing local control.
From Fig. 6 clearly the voltage magnitude is most vul-
nerable during high irradiance and low consumption, in
fact the voltage limit of 1.1 p.u. is exceeded during this
operation with centralized control. Furthermore, the dashed
contour lines show that during local reactive power control,
the node R15 voltage magnitude will not exceed 1.1 p.u..
This clearly emphasizes the necessary tradeoff between
voltage vulnerability and loss minimization.
Based on the heatmap for irradiance and consumption
for CPH, the local control strategy will at most result in
1.04 p.u. at node R15, while the centralized control can
reach 1.06 p.u.. This is not exceeding the voltage magni-
tude limit of 1.1 p.u.. However, in a future scenario, the
operating area could move towards the vulnerable region as
houses become more energy and cost efficient and PV
penetration increases.
6.1 Perturbations in physical system
Besides the long-term changes affecting the operational
situation, the occurrence of perturbations in the physical
system can be interpreted as shifting the operational area in
the irradiance-consumption plane. This interpretation is
valid under the assumption that the effects are only ana-
lyzed during static operation.
From the results in the first test scenario, the feeder
experience overvoltage during high irradiance and low
consumption when being centrally controlled. Therefore,
the effect of physical perturbations is studied firstly during
current normal operation of CPH, which is highlighted in
the blue area of Fig. 7, and secondly during more vulner-
able operation, highlighted by in the yellow area of Fig. 7.
In both studies, the possible situations due to exposure of
physical perturbations are included.
For each operational scenario, changes in consumption
of 5%, 10% and 20%, negative and positive, and changes in
irradiance of 50 W/m2, 100 W/m2 and 200 W/m2, negative
and positive, are considered. The changes in the opera-
tional situation caused by the physical perturbations are
represented in Fig. 7 in the green and the red areas for
normal and vulnerable operation, respectively.
The physical perturbations are simulated in the cyber-
physical simulation platform while controlling the PV
Fig. 5 Active power losses in the modified LV feeder using central
DC, solid lines, and local DL, dashed lines, control, for different
consumption and irradiance levels (Crosses show irradiance level
where centralized control has 1 kW less losses than local control)
Fig. 6 Irradiance and consumption heatmap for normal operation in
Copenhagen, with contour lines representing the voltage magnitude of
node R15 during centralized control, solid line, and local control,
dashed line
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plants through the two control strategies. During local
control, the system is simulated for a couple of seconds in
each of the situations in the blue and yellow areas of Fig. 7,
and exposed to each of the physical perturbations returning
results representing the system operation in the blue, green,
yellow and red areas of Fig. 7.
For the centralized control strategy, the reactive power
is optimized at the situations in the blue and yellow areas
of Fig. 7. After one second of simulation, the system is
exposed to a perturbation in the physical system and sim-
ulated for further four seconds. Then the reactive power is
optimized again, and the system is simulated for an addi-
tional five seconds. This gives an opportunity to analyze
the impact of physical perturbations pre- and post-
optimization.
The simulation results showed that in any of the normal
operating situations, the system will survive the perturba-
tions in the physical system considered, as none of the
green areas in Fig. 7 cause overvoltage according to Fig. 6.
For the vulnerable operating situation, the simulation
results for 5% consumption and exposure to a 20% con-
sumption increase, and a 200 W/m2 irradiance, increase
and decrease, are shown in Fig. 8.
In both plots of Fig. 8 the solid lines represent the
simulation results during centralized control after a per-
turbation and before the optimizer has reacted to the new
operational situation. The dashed lines represent the post
perturbation and optimization results and the dotted lines
represent local control.
The system losses in Fig. 8a as a function of irradiance
show that at high irradiance and low consumption, a con-
sumption increase, ?D, and irradiance decrease, -G, will
increase the losses until the reactive power has been opti-
mized according to the new operational situation. At
1000 W/m2, the pre-optimization losses nearly reach the
local control system losses.
An irradiance increase, ?G, will have the opposite
effect as the pre-optimization losses are lower than the
post-optimization losses. The reason is clearly visible in
Fig. 8b where the irradiance increase causes the pre-opti-
mization node R15 voltage magnitude to violate the 1.1 pu
voltage limit. The optimizer then lowers the voltage as seen
by the post-optimization voltage magnitude, which
increase the system losses. This observation shows the
importance of caution when choosing an appropriate time-
period between running the optimizer.
6.2 Voltage regulation strategy coordination
Through the analysis of the effects of local and cen-
tralized PV plant reactive power control, a set of guidelines
for when to use local and centralized reactive power con-
trol of the PV systems in the modified LV feeder in Fig. 3b
are established from a network loss minimization and
voltage stability perspective.
The guidelines for coordinating the two control strate-
gies are represented in Fig. 9, where the blue color repre-
sents areas to use local control and the orange color shows
areas to use centralized control.
First observation, marked in Fig. 9, is made from the
direct comparison between the two strategies during no
Fig. 7 Irradiance-consumption plane with the normal operation of
Copenhagen in blue, including the area of operation during physical
perturbations, in green, and a vulnerable operating area, in yellow,
with matching physical perturbation area, in red
Fig. 8 Results from simulating physical perturbations during 5%
consumption operating situation represented by the network losses
and the node R15 voltage magnitude
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perturbations in the physical system. Here the results in
Fig. 5 show that for each consumption level, the irradiance
point where losses are significantly lower during central-
ized compared to local control. As an assumption for this
work, a loss reduction of 1 kW is chosen as the point of
using centralized control instead of local.
The second observation is based on the analysis of the
impact from changes in consumption and irradiance level
within the vulnerable operating area of Fig. 7. Here the
perturbations could cause overvoltage in node R15, espe-
cially during low consumption and high irradiance.
Therefore, the high voltage vulnerability area in the bottom
right corner of the irradiance-consumption plane is marked
in blue in Fig. 9. Here three dashed lines represent the
severity of physical perturbations, the system should be
able to resist, with the largest to smallest areas representing
a consumption change of 20%, 10% and 5%, and an irra-
diance change of 200, 100 and 50 W/m2, respectively.
While the local control strategy offers security against
overvoltage and decrease the utilization of communication,
centralized control is recommended in the orange area of
Fig. 9, as it can substantially decrease network losses
without jeopardizing the voltage magnitudes during per-
turbations in the physical system. Utilizing centralized
control however, entails a vulnerability towards distur-
bances in the cyber system, the effects of which are eval-
uated in the following section.
6.3 Centralized control during cyber disturbances
Through utilizing the cyber-physical simulation plat-
form established in this work, the effects of three different
cyber disturbances are investigated and analyzed:
1) The occurrence of noise in the acquisition and
communication of observations in the physical system,
of zero mean and 0.5%, 1% and 2% standard
deviation.
2) The substitution of one or two of the acquired
measurements by zeros. This scenario represents an
extreme case where the state estimator fails and allow
zero-readings as input to the centralized controller
[30]. While this situation is unlikely, it is important to
consider extreme scenarios when investigating the
network security.
3) The occurrence of noise in the communication and
interpretation of command signals, of zero mean and
0.5%, 1% and 2% standard deviation.
For each of the cyber disturbances, the LV feeder is
simulated with centralized control in three different oper-
ating situations, each representing one of the three areas in
Fig. 9.
1) 60% consumption and irradiance of 200 W/m2.
2) 20% consumption and irradiance of 900 W/m2.
3) 70% consumption and irradiance of 800 W/m2.
When noise is introduced in the measurement acquisi-
tion part of the cyber system, the immediate effect will be
on the performance of the optimizer. The investigation of
the effects of the first cyber disturbance for each of the
three operating situations is therefore done by comparison
of the network losses  calculated by the optimizer using
the original, correct, measurements, ` calculated by the
optimizer using measurements subject noise with the three
different magnitudes of standard deviation, ´ calculated by
the RTDS in the cyber-physical simulation platform, and ˆ
found from the first test scenario for the operating situa-
tions during local control.
Figure 10a, b and c, show the network losses, sorted
ascendingly, for the three operating situations from mini-
mum to maximum, where a standard deviation of 0.5%, 1%
and 2% is assumed in simulations 1 to 200, 201 to 400 and
401 to 600, respectively.
The effects of measurement noise are clearly visible in
Fig. 10a, where the network losses calculated by the opti-
mizer using the original measurements is constant, and the
losses calculated using noisy measurements deviates sub-
stantially as a function of the magnitude of the noise
standard deviation. The noise therefore affects the opti-
mizer to believe that it either can operate with fewer net-
work losses, or must operate at higher network losses.
Fig. 9 Guidelines for operating the PV systems with local, blue area,
and centralized, orange area, reactive power control
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The difference between the optimizer calculated net-
work losses and the actual losses observed in the RTDS are
of cause due to the noise in the measurements which dis-
torts the observability of the physical system. The severity
of the impact from noise in measurements, from a network
loss minimization perspective, can be analyzed by com-
parison of the RTDS observed losses and the previously
calculated network losses during local control for the first
operating situation. At a low noise magnitude, only a single
simulation caused network losses close to the expected
losses from local control. However, at 1 and 2% standard
deviation more than 10 of the simulations, equal to 5%,
caused network losses only marginally different from what
was found during local control.
By comparison of the effects from measurement noise in
the three different operating situations, clearly the first
situation is most affected, while the two other situations are
only marginally affected. The effect is based on the influ-
ence of the PV plants in the system and the gradient in the
network losses caused by changing the power factor set-
points.
As the nonlinear optimization problem is solved using
the FMINCON algorithm, the optimal solution is found by
initializing the algorithm with the noisy measurements and
move in the direction of the largest negative gradient of the
network losses. During high irradiance and low noise
levels, the algorithm will therefore be more robust in terms
of finding the correct optimal solution than during low
irradiance. To have an impact during higher irradiance, the
cyber disturbances must be more significant, which is
studied in with the second cyber disturbance, where one or
two of the measurements have been substituted by zeros.
Substituting measurements by zeros can be interpreted
as severe noise in the cyber system. This has been tested by
randomly selecting one or two of the measurements used in
the optimizer and substituting its value by zero and main-
taining original values for all other measurements. As with
the previous cyber disturbance under investigation, the
system is simulated during the three different operating
situations using the cyber-physical simulation platform,
and the effects on each situation are evaluated from a
network loss perspective, shown in Fig. 11.
The x-axis of Fig. 11 represents the simulation number
and from simulation 1 to 200, one of the measurements has
been substituted by zero and from simulation 201 to 400,
two measurements have been substituted. For each of the
three operating situations, the cyber disturbances cause the
optimizer to not converge, which is shown as 0 in the
ascendingly sorted losses in Fig. 11. In reality, the losses
will depend on the backup strategy chosen in case the
optimizer does not converge.
Comparing the losses calculated by the optimizer using
original and noisy measurements in Fig. 11a, clearly the
substitution of zeros for measurement values affect the
optimizer calculation results. The impact difference is
more severe than in Fig. 10a due to the chance of one or
two of the load point consumption levels being observed as
zero, thereby lowering the required power flow.
Comparing the results for each of the three operating
situations in Fig. 11a, b and c, the cyber disturbance has
larger impact during the second and third operating situa-
tions, because the disturbances in some occasions are large
enough to divert the optimizer from the global minimum
and instead commands more inductive power factor set-
points from the PV plants according to a local minimum.
As the irradiance is high during these operating situations,
the suboptimal control of the power factor will have a large
Fig. 10 Effects of small noise in the measurement acquisition
channel during three different operating situations with centralized
reactive power control
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effect on the system losses, visible from the RTDS
acquired losses in Fig. 11b and c.
Besides noise in the measurement acquisition channel,
the effect on the centralized control strategy is evaluated by
exposing the distribution of command signals, i.e. power
factor set-points, to noise of varying standard deviation.
The system is simulated for each of the three operating
situations, represented by the blue, green and red parts of
the lines in Fig. 12. A noise standard deviation of 0.5% is
assumed in the simulations 1 to 200, 601 to 800 and 1201
to 1400. For simulations from 201 to 400, 801 to 1000 and
1401 to 1600, the standard deviation of the noise is
assumed 1% and for the rest of the simulation results, the
noise standard deviation is assumed 2%.
From the network losses, in Fig. 12a, the cyber distur-
bance on the power factor set-points clearly has an impact,
and most so for the second operating situation. This is due
to the high percentage of PV system generation compared
to load consumption in this scenario, which increases the
influence of the reactive power control of the PV systems
in the network. The effects of the set-point noise also
affects the voltage magnitude of the nodes in the system,
most so for the node furthest away from the feeder, i.e.
node R18, as its voltage is affected by the error from all the
prior feeders.
The voltage magnitude disturbance of node R18 is vis-
ible in Fig. 12b for all the three operating situations, from
which the impact can be considered only marginal. How-
ever, as the noise magnitude increases, so will the distur-
bance. The vulnerability of the voltage in the considered
operating situations is not close enough to the upper limit
of 1.1 p.u. to experience overvoltage, as the maximum
voltage is experienced in the second operating situation
equal to 1.09 p.u.
In this paper we considered full observability, which
means there are sufficient measurements from the system,
and perhaps the effect is not pronounced due to this, or the
simplicity of the algorithm for centralized control itself.
This study however shows that the cyber system can affect
the operation of the LV feeder, specifically as disturbances
in the system losses and the node voltage magnitudes.
Furthermore, the cyber system disturbance simulation test
cases show the importance of considering a backup strat-
egy for the centralized control in case the optimizer does
not converge.
Fig. 11 Effects of large noise in the measurement acquisition
channel during three different operating situations with centralized
reactive power control
Fig. 12 Results from simulating cyber disturbance between opti-
mizer and PV plants for three situations
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7 Conclusion
Integration of photovoltaic plants in the low voltage
level of the distribution network entails security challenges.
One of these issues is high voltage levels at feeder end
nodes. This however can be handled by control of the
inverters and their reactive power transfer through the
utilization of local control strategies. In current literature
however, researchers propose using centralized control
strategies to optimize the operation of the network and to
fulfill an overall objective.
While centralized control improves utilization of the
network infrastructure, it simultaneously pushes the net-
work operation towards more vulnerable regions. Com-
bined with the dependency of information and
communication technology, centralized control can cause
hazardous operation during changing operating
situations.
Therefore, this paper has proposed an investigation of
boundaries in the irradiance-consumption plane of a low
voltage residential feeder with high share of photovoltaics.
The evaluation of the two control strategies is done based
on simulations conducted in an established cyber-physical
simulation platform. The boundaries for coordinating
between local and centralized control have been found for a
specific feeder during normal operation and while consid-
ering perturbations in the physical system, i.e. changing
consumption and irradiance.
The identified boundaries can assist in the decision-
making process of choosing a suitable reactive power
control strategy for the photovoltaic plants during different
operational situations.
With the representation of the cyber system, simulation
platform was used to evaluate the effects from cyber dis-
turbances on the centralized voltage regulation strategy.
During small magnitude noise in the data acquisition
channel, network losses were affected while operating in
medium consumption and low irradiance conditions. Fur-
thermore, the system was susceptible to large cyber dis-
turbances. During all three considered operating situations,
the optimizer was unable to converge at the global mini-
mum, or at all in some occasions.
Possible areas of future work include, removing the
assumption of full observability and evaluate different
cyber system designs to assist in forming the control
strategy coordination. Furthermore, evaluating the effects
of physical and cyber system disturbances on the cyber
system performance, and generalization of the boundary
identification for coordinating the control strategies could
be considered.
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